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COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW, AND THE 





Let me start with some personal anecdotes regarding the life of 
he who was rightly termed “the great Litvinoff.”1  Borrowing again 
from the same source, I shall call them “Litvinovian 
observations.”2  To each observation I shall assign a label; each 
will attempt to illustrate some trait of his intriguing personality. 
The first one I shall name, not without a certain boldness, 
“Litvinovian Intransigence.”3  From the outset I must clarify that I 
am talking about intransigence in certain matters only—minor 
                                                                                                             
 Professor of Law, Universidad Católica Argentina; Visiting Professor, 
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; Researcher, Argentine 
National Council for the Research in the Humanities (CONICET). LL.B., 
Universidad Católica Argentina; M.St., Oxford; Ph.D., Universidad de Buenos 
Aires.  This article was the basis for an oral presentation at a workshop at the 
Paul M. Hebert Law Center in honor of the late Saúl Litvinoff.  The flavor of an 
oral presentation and the anecdotes regarding don Saúl’s life have been 
preserved on purpose.  Special thanks to John Baker, Alice Lapeyre, Henri 
Lapeyre, Michael Leachman, Patrick Martin, Joaquín María Migliore, and 
Simón Muñoz for their valuable comments.  I would also like to thank the many 
faculty members present at the workshop for their wonderful questions. 
1. From the words read by don Saúl’s colleague and friend Cheney C. 
Joseph, Jr. on the occasion of don Saúl’s funeral, a copy of which is on file with 
the author.  The great Litvinoff’s life was aptly evocated in a piece by Agustín 
Parise and Julio Romañach, the latter having a long standing friendship with don 
Saúl.  See Agustin Parise & Julio Romañach, Saúl Litvinoff (1925-2010), LA 
LEY [L.L.] Feb. 2, 2010 (Arg.); and the English version in this same volume of 
the JCLS, at 17.  For a more detached point of view on Litvinoff’s life, see 
Honoring the Legacy of Litvinoff, Years of Service 1964-2009, 6.6 THE 
CIVILIAN, Feb. 2010 at 1. 
2. Professor Paul R. Baier rightly pointed out to me that they are actually 
“Legarrian observations” on don Saúl’s life.  Comment by Prof. Baier 
subsequent to the oral presentation of February 4th, 2010 at the LSU Law 
Center. 
3. Let me share with you, gentle reader, that after some hesitation the senior 
members of the faculty present at the workshop laughed heartily—with seeming 
approval—when I promulgated my choice of this label. 
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matters it would seem, matters of detail.  I shall illustrate 
Litvinovian Intransigence with two one-on-one experiences. 
My first encounter with Saúl Litvinoff occurred at a time when 
he and other LSU faculty were visiting Argentina.  Roberto Bosca, 
then Dean of Universidad Austral Law School, had asked if I could 
take don Saúl and him as my guests to the Jockey Club in Buenos 
Aires.  The three of us were to have dinner.  But at the lobby of the 
Club, don Saúl was kindly requested to wear a blue jacket in place 
of the extremely elegant beige jacket that he was wearing.  I had 
completely forgotten to forewarn my guest that light colors are not 
admitted at night in this traditional venue.  This omission would 
not have been a problem since the Club has extra blue jackets 
intended precisely for these situations.  That is, it would not have 
been a problem had it not been for Litvinovian Intransigence. 
Saúl refused to take the old, worn out, rather dirty jacket he 
was offered by the bewildered janitor.  He would not remove his 
own beautiful garment, even if that entailed leaving the Jockey 
Club and, as it turned out, dining at a much less elegant restaurant: 
a last minute, improvised choice.  For don Saúl, the only thing that 
really mattered was that his own elegance had been preserved. 
The second anecdote instantiating Litvinovian Intransigence 
also took place in the early 2000’s in Buenos Aires.  During this 
period of time, my country was in the midst of economic turmoil.  
Many businesses would not take Argentine currency; only U.S. 
dollars.  That was the case at the Alvear Palace, a venerable 
Parisian-like hotel located on the most beautiful street in the city.  
The Alvear Palace was Saúl’s favorite hotel. 
When Saúl attempted to pay with pesos, the manager explained 
to him the Alvear Palace’s policy (and perhaps the reasons thereof: 
I do not remember).  The reaction was immediate.  Saúl stated, “I 
am Argentine, I am in Argentina, I will pay pesos or I will lodge 
somewhere else.”  The manager was perplexed.  But even before 
any kind of response could have been elicited, Litvinoff had 
already exited the building.  Litvinoff would not negotiate.  He 
would stick to principle.  What principle?  That I do not know.4 
I move now to “Litvinovian Culture,” another remarkable trait 
of don Saúl.  My next story happened in Argentina in 2001 when 
several members of this faculty, including then Chancellor John 
                                                                                                             
4. This reference to principle was (by far) the remark that the audience 
celebrated the most.  As it happens, it was an ad-lib. 
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Costonis, were visiting IAE—the Universidad Austral Business 
School.  At some point we were all in the Chapel with an unknown 
gentleman showing us around.  The gentleman indicated that the 
altarpiece—a Nativity scene—was by a famous Spanish painter 
whose name I don’t recall.  “That is incorrect,” interjected Saúl, 
reminding me of Muriel Spark’s unfathomable Miss Jean Brodie. 
“The painter,” he proceeded, “was indeed called [ . . . ] but this 
was by a namesake of his [ . . . ] who is Mexican, not Spanish.” Of 
course, the guide was flabbergasted.  He had given this tour a 
number of times, and he spoke with a mixture of relaxed pride and 
carelessness typical of one who thinks that he already knows 
everything about his trade.  He had not counted on Litvinovian 
Culture.5  Nor had the gentleman counted on “Litvinovian Wit,” 
which takes me to a third remarkable trait of don Saúl. 
Cheney Joseph observed, on the occasion of the funeral, that 
Saúl was endowed with “sarcasm laced with warm affection.”6  I 
think these words capture “Litvinovian Wit.”   
In 2005, I was lingering in the faculty lounge of the LSU Law 
Center when our beloved colleague unexpectedly showed up.  It 
was a Saturday morning.  “Are you free tonight?” he asked.  
“Yes,” I replied.  Saúl stated, “Well, in that case I could take you 
to the movies.  Is there one you would like to see?”  Unlike the 
first question, which took me by surprise, I replied immediately, 
“The Phantom of the Opera.”  And “The Phantom” it was. 
I had listened to the music a thousand times and found the idea 
of watching the movie version of the Broadway show extremely 
exciting.  As we exited the theatre, master Litvinoff asked if I had 
enjoyed the movie.  With some hesitation due to the tone of the 
question, I passionately described the movie version of “The 
Phantom” as a fabulous, incredible adaptation.  But Saúl wryly 
observed: 
Well, my dear, [actually, he said Querido, one of his 
favorite Spanish terms] the movie was indeed very bad.  It 
could have been worse, but it was really bad.  Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                             
5. John C. Costonis observed as we left the Chapel, seemingly intent in 
distressing all of us present:  “Saúl is a renaissance man.”  And how right he 
was! 
6. From Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. words on the occasion of the funeral, see 
supra note 1. 
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your whim has been indulged, and that was what mattered 
this time. 
Perhaps this was a taste of “sarcasm laced with warm 
affection.” 
Finally: “Litvinovian Charm.”  On one occasion, Saúl was a 
dinner guest at my parent’s residence.  I have very fond and funny 
recollections of the dinner.  When I learned of his death a few 
weeks ago, I asked my mother if there was anything she recalled 
from that evening so that I could share it with you today.  
Interestingly, she did not single out any particular moment 
(although I remember, for example, that Litvinoff arrived with 
remarkable presents for both of my parents).  Instead, she said, 
“What a charming old man he was!”  Surely, intransigence, 
culture, and wit had been displayed throughout the dinner.  But the 
only thing that caught my mother’s memory was Litvinovian 
Charm—the one characteristic among all of the Litvinovia I have 
selected that we all should cherish in our own memories as we 
move on in this land that Saúl has relinquished for good to be with 
the “great spirit up there.”7  With his charm in mind, and using it as 
a source of inspiration, I will move on to the second part of this 
lecture. 
 
II THE MULTIFARIOUS FRAGMENTATION OF UNIFORM LAW 
 
The title of this presentation is an ambitious one: “Common 
Law, Civil Law, and the Challenge from Federalism.”8  Henri 
                                                                                                             
7. See e-mail from Saúl Litvinoff to Santiago Legarre (Sep. 20, 2009) (on 
file with author).  The full sentence was:  “Si me verás depende de tu gran 
espíritu allá arriba, pero si yo sigo abajo te veré con mucho gusto pues ya se te 
espera con cariño,” which translates to:  “Whether you see me or not [when you 
come to LSU in February 2010] depends on your great spirit up there, but if I 
am still down here I shall have much pleasure in seeing you.”  I have reason to 
think that Saúl was a believer, although I acknowledge that this view is contrary 
to a widespread assumption favored and reinforced by Saúl himself.  I will not 
go further into Saúl’s religious views here other than to mention one more 
exchange with Saúl.  In reply to my Christmas wishes of 2006, he wrote: “Tus 
plegarias siempre me vienen muy bien y te las agradezco mucho,” which 
translates to:  “Your prayers always do me good and I appreciate them very 
much.”  See e-mail from Saúl Litvinoff to Santiago Legarre (Dec. 22, 2006) (on 
file with the author). 
8. After some reflection and consultation with my friend Paul Yowell, I 
decided that “from Federalism” does a better job here than “of Federalism.”  The 
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Lapeyre, Jr., a distinguished member of the Louisiana bar in 
attendance here today, made an astute observation: “I can't imagine 
how you can cover the subject of your talk in only an hour and 
fifteen minutes, but then, perhaps, you will not attempt to lecture 
on ALL there is to know about the common law, civil law, and the 
challenge from federalism.”9 
Maybe the title should not be taken too seriously.  Maybe it is 
more like a catch-phrase.  Had I chosen a title such as “Recent 
developments of federalism in Greenland” (or in Argentina, for 
that matter), Professor Moréteau would likely be the lone member 
in attendance.  On the other hand, a title that includes three key 
notions in it—common law, civil law, and federalism—has a 
greater likelihood to catch the interest of lawyers.  Indeed, such a 
title is relevant to a family lawyer, a criminal lawyer, a 
constitutional lawyer, a civil lawyer, and a common lawyer alike. 
The title, however, is not only a catch-phrase.  It also illustrates 
a methodology or style of presentation which involves the picking 
of an excuse to deal with a substantial problem of law.  For 
instance, my mental process for selecting this title was the 
following.  
I would like to deal with a certain issue that really matters, try 
to understand it better, explore its potential, and then be able to 
explain it to others (colleagues, students).  For those purposes I 
choose a given jurisdiction—an excuse—that instantiates the 
problem at stake in an interesting and rich way.  It is not about how 
many jurisdictions I pick; it is about how much I can learn from the 
selected one(s).10  In other words, it is not so much about the 
                                                                                                             
 
reader shall judge after exploring the argument.  I would like to share with the 
reader that one of the reasons I had in mind for the choice of preposition was 
that, when I Google’d both alternatives, there were a million more of the one I 
ultimately rejected.  That should tell you a lot about the extent of my love for 
Google searches as source of authority. 
9. E-mail from F. Henri Lapeyre, Jr., to Santiago Legarre (Jan. 27, 2010) 
(on file with author). 
10. The same, by the way, happens with the study and teaching of the class 
I have been charged with for the last few years at LSU Law Center, 
“Comparative Constitutional Law.”   When it comes to selection of countries for 
purposes of comparative analysis the medieval saying applies:  “Non multa sed 
multum”—a saying that captures the essence of the distinction between the 
English words many and much. 
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quantity of comparisons as it is about having a topic deserving to 
be compared on account of its worth and relevance. 
What is the topic and why is it relevant? Relevance being a 
relative concept in law, I will rephrase the latter part of my 
question.  Why is it relevant for an American readership and 
audience? 
The challenges for the common law that flow from federalism 
in the United States can be exemplified in a way which may 
illuminate both the connection of the Argentine situation to those 
challenges and the relevance of my analysis with a view towards a 
possible solution to some American problems.  
The following are only a few examples of these American 
problems that are related to the aforementioned Argentine 
situation:  the Erie11 doctrine and the idea that there is no such 
thing as national common law; the Restatements of the Law and 
other works by the American Law Institute; the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the varying interpretations by the U.S. state 
courts; and the several instances of the U.S. federal government 
using federal funding to mandate conformity with national 
standards set forth in federal legislation.12 
Moving now to my excuse:  the case of my country:  what I 
have called “the Argentine situation.”  It is a well-known fact that 
in 1853 Argentina used the Constitution of the United States as a 
source of inspiration for its own constitution enacted in that year.  
Another well-known fact is that Argentina deviated from this 
model in some instances.  It is not so well-known, however, that 
one of these deviations was the distribution of powers to make and 
apply the law.   
Pursuant to the American model of 1787, the powers not 
delegated to the Federal Government are reserved to the states.  
                                                                                                             
11. The Erie Doctrine, which follows from the Supreme Court landmark 
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 
1188 (1938), requires U.S. federal courts to honor state common law when 
deciding state law issues. 
12. Patrick H. Martin mentioned to me the proposed legislation requiring 
each state in the U.S. to forbid text-messaging while driving if the state wishes 
to receive Federal highway funding.  Michael Leachman also noted that this 
strong-arm approach was successfully used by the U.S. federal government to 
mandate a uniform minimum age of 21 for purchasing and publicly possessing 
alcoholic beverages.  See, The National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. 
§ 158 (1984). 
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This general principle of federalism permeates the whole American 
constitutional design and is confirmed by the Tenth Amendment.13  
The Argentine text of 1853 embraced this general principle of 
federalism and expressly memorialized it in Article 101 of the 
Federal Constitution (currently, Article 121).14  Nevertheless, a 
power the framers of the U.S. Constitution did not delegate to the 
Federal Government—and which, therefore, was retained by the 
states—was indeed delegated by the Argentine drafters to the 
Federal Government:  the general legislative power, if I may call it 
so on this occasion, using a hopefully justified simplification.15 
Rather limited legislative powers have been vested in the 
United States Congress16 (at least in theory17).  Instead, most 
legislative powers have been retained by the states.  These 
legislative powers are exercised primarily by the respective state 
legislatures (in all cases, but especially in Louisiana) and 
secondarily by the state courts interpreting and applying statutes 
and the common law.18 
By way of contrast, the Argentine Constitution vested in the 
Federal Congress the power to make and subsequently develop 
what in our country is termed “derecho común,” or substantive 
law, i.e., legislation on civil, commercial, criminal and other 
matters. Although derecho común translates literally as “common 
                                                                                                             
13. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.” US. CONST. amend. X. 
14. “The Provinces retain all powers not delegated by this Constitution to 
the Federal Government.”  In the case of older texts, I follow Ma. Laura San 
Martino de Dromi’s compilation: MA. LAURA SAN MARTINO DE DROMI, 
DOCUMENTOS CONSTITUCIONALES ARGENTINOS (1994). 
15. In the United States the adjective “general” is used to describe the 
power of each state.  Thus:  “power is shared between state governments of 
general jurisdiction and a federal government of delegated and enumerated 
powers.” Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 
20 (2000) (emphasis added). 
16. Cf. the different clauses of US. CONST. art. I, § 8, and their 
interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 552 (1995).  The foregoing is without prejudice to open rules allowing for a 
limited extension of enumerated powers.  Cf. particularly US. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 18.  
17. Questions have been raised, rightly, as to the extent of this limited 
delegation in practice.  George, supra note 15, at 22-23.  
18. See generally ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, UNA INTRODUCCIÓN AL 
SISTEMA LEGAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (1990). 
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law” it is better described under the name of ius commune, to avoid 
confusion with the common law system.19  Having said that, in the 
Argentine legal system, the content of derecho común is analogous 
to that of common law in the United States, in the sense that both 
are “general law,” even though they obviously differ considerably 
in other aspects, e.g., “derecho común” is enacted, whereas 
common law is case law.  In sum, the Argentine provinces—unlike 
the American states—delegated to the Federal Government the 
enactment of “general” law.  
Why so?  The situation of colonial legislation, mostly imported 
from, or consisting of Spanish law, was absolutely chaotic.  In the 
words of one of the most conspicuous members of the 1853 
Constitutional Convention, Benjamín Gorostiaga, a new legislation 
was needed in order to replace the Spanish laws, which were 
confusing—on account of their number—and inconsistent. 
Furthermore, he added, if as a consequence of the emulation of the 
American model every province were to retain their general 
legislative power, the country’s legislation would become a 
baffling maze of legal rules leading to “inconceivable evils.”20 
Objections had been raised when this criterion was put forward 
at the Constitutional Convention of 1853.  Delegate Zavalía 
asserted that the idea entailed an undue encroachment on the 
powers of local legislatures and, therefore, on each province’s 
sovereignty.  And, as source of authority, he brought up the 
American model, where “each of them [in reference to the states] 
enacts its own laws.”21 
Delegate Zenteno tried to mediate this debate.  In an attempt to 
ease delegate Zavalía’s concerns, delegate Zenteno explained that 
the Federal Congress was “a meeting of men from all the 
provinces”22 which would be sufficient to protect provincial 
sovereignty and interests.   
Ultimately, the Argentine drafters chose to deviate from the 
U.S. model in an attempt to unify the law with a view to putting an 
end to the chaos brought about by Spanish legislation.  For this 
                                                                                                             
19. Cf.  infra note 26. 
20. 4 EMILIO RAVIGNANI, ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 528-
529  (1937). 
21. Id. 528. 
22. Id.at 529. 
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purpose, a centralizing legislative movement was deemed 
suitable.23  “Inconceivable evils” would, therefore, be avoided.  
But this had, perhaps, an unintended effect:  the delegation of 
the mass of legislative powers to the Federal Congress left the 
provincial judiciaries with little law to apply.24  If the Federal 
Congress was to enact derecho común, then this law would 
naturally be federal and, therefore, be applied by the Federal 
Judiciary pursuant to the predominant federalist principle 
enshrined in the constitutions of countries such as the United 
States.25   
This story, however, does not finish just there.  One of the 
original provinces, Buenos Aires, had decided not to join the newly 
born Argentine Republic in 1853 for reasons that are not germane 
here.  When this large and rich province changed its mind seven 
years later, it established as a condition precedent that a Provincial 
Constitutional Convention would review the original text of the 
Federal Constitution.  
In order to prevent the aforesaid implications of the 
centralizing movement, the Buenos Aires Provincial Convention 
proposed the so-called “reservation” in favor of provincial 
jurisdictions in 1860.  Federal drafters accepted this proposal soon 
afterwards at a new ad hoc Constitutional Convention convened 
that same year.  By means of a rule rather cryptically worded,26 
                                                                                                             
23. Centralization was not complete, since—by virtue of the principle laid 
down in the current Article 121 of the Argentine Constitution (see supra note 
14)—the provinces retained legislative power to enact legislation on local 
procedure and public law. 
24. In Argentina, like in the United States, the federal judiciary coexists 
with a local judiciary:  the provincial courts, in the former country; the state 
courts, in the latter one. 
25. Cf. US. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1.  
26. The original wording—of 1853—of Article 64, paragraph 11, of the 
Argentine Constitution included among the powers of the Federal Congress: 
“[t]o lay down the civil, commercial, criminal and mining Codes;” but in 1860 
an addition was made:  “those codes shall not alter local jurisdiction, and [ . . . ] 
shall be applied by provincial courts.”  Accordingly, Article 100 was amended 
that year as well, so the original text: “the Supreme Court and the lower courts 
of the Nation shall hear and decide all cases concerning issues governed [ . . . ] 
by the federal laws” was completed with the phrase “except for the reservation 
of Article 67 [former 64], paragraph 11.”  The latter article is precisely where 
the term “reservation” is used to describe the spirit of this amendment.  At 
present, these provisions are included in Articles 75, paragraph 12, and 116, 
respectively.   
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provincial courts were granted the application of derecho común, 
despite derecho común being federal in nature.  Thus, an exception 
to the aforementioned federalist principle was established. 
In 1910—a time equally distant between the bicentennial 
Argentina celebrates this year and the 1810 revolution that marked 
the path toward independence—the eminent jurist Felipe Espil 
shrewdly noted that this so-called “reservation” marked a departure 
from the rationale behind the U.S. system.27 Espil captured the 
very essence of the problem I want to raise awareness about here.  
As he put it, the original effort at unification had resulted in the 
possibility—perhaps unnoticed in 1853—of “depriving [provincial 
courts] of their power to hear and resolve cases on matters already 
under their jurisdiction.”28  In 1860, in order to remedy an anomaly 
(according to American federal terms), a new anomaly came into 
being:  pursuant to the new article 67, paragraph 11, each 
Provincial Judiciary would be qualified to render an actually 
different interpretation of the same federal rule, be it the Civil, 
Commercial, Criminal codes, or the like.  This explains why 100 
years ago Espil complained that “there were fourteen 
interpretations of just one code across the nation.”29  His 
complaint, amplified by the greater number of provincial 
jurisdictions existing today, still seems to ring in our ears.  
Unfortunately, all of the attempts to cure the problem have failed 
so far.30  
                                                                                                             
27. FELIPE ESPIL, LA SUPREMA CORTE FEDERAL 193 (1915):  “we have, for 
compelling reasons, departed from that rationale [behind the U.S. system].” 
28. Id. at 193-194. 
29. Id. at 194. 
30. For the various attempts to unify law—Federal Court of Cassation, grant 
of jurisdictional authority to the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice to decide 
on substantial matters concerning derecho común, etc.—see SANTIAGO 
LEGARRE, EL REQUISITO DE LA TRASCENDENCIA EN EL RECURSO 
EXTRAORDINARIO 44-71 (1994). 
